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INTRODUCTION 
The definition of “Artificial Intelligence” is 
not easy and remains contested1, especially 
given science’s inability to nail a definition of 
“intelligence” accepted by all. Defi nitions abound 
and generally overlap by pointing to ‘agents’ 
(programs running on computer systems) able to 
learn, adapt and deploy themselves successfully 
in dynamic and uncer tain environments. 
Intell igence in that sense intersects with 
autonomy and adaptability, through the ability to 
learn from a dynamic environment. 
1  There is no standardized and globally accepted defi nition for 
what AI is. “The choice of the very name “artifi cial intelligence” is a 
perfect example: if the mathematician John McCarthy used these 
words to propose the Dartmouth Summer Research Project – the 
workshop of summer 1956 that many consider as the kick-off of 
the discipline – it was as much to set it apart from related research, 
such as automata theory and cybernetics, as to give it a proper 
defi nition […].There are actually many defi nitions for artifi cial 
intelligence. A fi rst great group of defi nitions could be called 
“essentialist”, aiming at defi ning the end-goal a system has to show 
to enter the category  […].Besides this – and often complementarily 
– are the defi nitions one could call “analytical”, which means they 
unfold a list of required abilities to create artifi cial intelligence, 
in part or in whole. […]”. Tom Morisse, “AI New Age, Fabernovel, 
February 2017 https://en.fabernovel.com/insights/tech-en/
ais-new-new-age ; See also U.K. Government Offi ce for Science, 
Report on “Artifi cial Intelligence: opportunities and implications 
for the future of decision-making”, 2016 (page 6). See also https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/fi le/566075/gs-16-19-artifi cial-intelligence-ai-report.pdf
If the defi nitional boundaries of Artifi cial 
Intelligence (AI) remains contested, experts 
agree that we are witnessing a revolution. 
“Is this time different?” is the question 
that they worryingly argue over when 
they analyze the socio-economic impact 
of the AI revolution as compared with the 
other industrial revolutions of the 19th and 
20th centuries. This Schumpeterian wave 
may prove to be a creative destruction 
raising incomes, enhancing quality of life for 
all and generating previously unimagined 
jobs to replace those that get automatized. 
Or it may turn out to be a destructive 
creation leading to mass unemployment 
abuses, or loss of control over decision-
making processes. This depends on the 
velocity and magnitude of the development 
and diffusion of AI technologies, a point 
over which experts diverge widely. 
Nicolas Miailhe
Co-founder and President, 
The Future Society 
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Understanding the rise 
of Artifi cial Intelligence 
DEFINING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
THE INTERSECTION OF BIG DATA, MACHINE LEARNING 
AND CLOUD COMPUTING
To understand the current renaissance of what we frame as 
“Artifi cial Intelligence,” which is as old as computer science, we need 
to turn to the convergence of three trends: i) Big Data, ii) machine 
learning and iii) cloud super-computing. In that sense, the rise of AI is 
really a manifestation of the digital revolution. One of its central laws, 
predicted in 1965 by Intel chip manufacturer co-founder Gordon 
Moore, tells us that computing power doubles every two years, on 
an average, at a constant cost2. This exponential growth has resulted 
from continued technoscientifi c prowess in miniaturization, bringing 
about the age of micro- and, now, nano-computing with increasing 
power; and along with it, the possibility of smart phones and the 
“Internet of Things.”
Coupled with the development of Internet communication protocols 
and machine virtualization, the digital revolution then made possible 
the availability of highly and easily scalable supercomputing 
capabilities on the cloud. From that point, the exponentially growing 
fl ow of high resolution data3  produced day after day by connected 
humans and machines could be processed by algorithms. 
These contexts fi nally made possible the fl ourishing of an old branch 
of computer science, called machine learning,4 where algorithms 
are capable of automatically sorting out complex patterns out of 
2  The fi rst processors in the 1970s could carry out about 92,000 instructions per second. The 
processor in an average modern smartphone can carry out billions of instructions per second.
3 IBM estimates that 90 percent of the world’s data has been created in the last two years. Looking 
at various application platforms, experts estimate that Spotify has 10 Petabytes in storage 
(1 Petabyte = 1 million Gigabyte); eBay has 90 PB; Facebook 300 PB; and Google 15 000 PB. For 
reference, the human brain has 2.5 Petabyte in storage. https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/
projects/machine-learning/machine-learning-infographic/ 
4  Short explanatory infographic from the Royal Society: https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/
projects/machine-learning/machine-learning-infographic/ 
very large data sets, either via supervised or 
unsupervised learning.5 The convergence of two 
branches of machine learning in particular have 
demonstrated impressive results over the past 
fi ve years: deep learning6 and reinforced learning.
AI VS. ROBOTICS
To better understand Artificial Intelligence as 
an interdisciplinary field, it is useful to draw and 
analyze its boundary with robotics. In both cases, 
we refer to ‘machines’ (since an algorithm is a 
robot, hence the shortened word ‘bot’ to refer to 
conversational computer programs); but while 
robotics is mostly material in its manifestations, 
and operates at the intersection of mechanical 
engineering, electrical engineering, and computer 
s c i e n c e s ,  a r t i f i c ia l  i n te l l i ge n c e is  m os t l y7 
immaterial and virtual in its manifestations. In 
order to simplify for analytical purposes, one can 
say that, in an “autonomous machine,” the AI is 
the intelligence, and refers to cognitive functions, 
while robotics refers to motor functions.
Indeed, the boundary between cognitive and 
motor functions is porous, since mobility requires 
sensing/knowing the environment. For example, 
advances in machine learning have played a 
crucial role in computer vision. That said, relying 
on materiality as a differentiating criterion is useful 
because it carries major industrial consequences 
affecting the growth potential of autonomous 
machines: the more complex the motor functions, 
the slower the growth, and vice versa.  The most 
popular symbols of the convergence between AI 
and robotics are self-driving cars and humanoid 
robots.
AI VS. NEUROSCIENCES
To then hone our understanding of the state of AI 
today and where it could go in the future, we need 
to turn to its relation with the interdisciplinary fi eld 
5  “There are many different kinds of algorithm used in machine 
learning. The key distinction between them is whether their learning 
is ‘unsupervised’ or ‘supervised’. Unsupervised learning presents a 
learning algorithm with an unlabeled set of data – that is, with no ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ answers – and asks it fi nd structure in the data, perhaps 
by clustering elements together – for example, examining a batch 
of photographs of faces and learning how to say how many different 
people there are. Google’s News service uses this technique to group 
similar news stories together, as do researchers in genomics looking for 
differences in the degree to which a gene might be expressed in a given 
population, or marketers segmenting a target audience.  Supervised 
learning involves using a labelled data set to train a model, which can 
then be used to classify or sort a new, unseen set of data (for example, 
learning how to spot a particular person in a batch of photographs). 
This is useful for identifying elements in data (perhaps key phrases or 
physical attributes), predicting likely outcomes, or spotting anomalies 
and outliers. Essentially this approach presents the computer with 
a set of ‘right answers’ and asks it to fi nd more of the same. Deep 
Learning is a form of supervised learning”. U.K. Government Offi ce 
for Science, Report on “Artifi cial Intelligence: opportunities and 
implications for the future of decision-making”, 2016 (page 6).
6  Short explanatory video here from the Royal Society: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHvf7Tagt18
7  AI refers to a program running on a computer, either embedded or on 
the cloud. It thus carries a very concrete material manifestation which 
we tend to forget at times.
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of neurosciences. The renaissance of AI since 2011 
is mostly attributed to the success of a branch of 
machine learning called “deep artificial neural 
networks” (also called deep learning), supported 
by another branch called “reinforcement learning”. 
Both branches claim to loosely emulate the way 
the brain processes information, in the way that 
they learn through pattern recognition.
It is crucial not to exaggerate the current state of 
convergence between AI and neurosciences. To 
date, our understanding of the extremely complex 
biochemical processes that run the human brain 
remain far beyond the reach of science. In short, 
the human brain largely remains a “black box,” 
and neuroscience knows how the brain functions 
mainly by correlating inputs and outputs. As such, 
there is not much that designers of algorithms 
can emulate from, especially given that machine 
learning still operates exclusively from the realm 
of statistics; that too on silicon-based computer 
systems, which are radically dif ferent from 
biological brains. A more meaningful convergence 
between the fields of AI and neuroscience is 
expected to unfold later this century, as we break 
into the “black box” and seek to understand the 
human brain in greater depth.
O w i n g  to  t h e  ve r y  d i f fe re n t  e vo l u t i o n a r y 
trajectories followed by artificial intelligence 
and our biological brains, two consequential 
differences should be singled out. First, humans 
can reliably develop pattern recognition and 
generalize transferable knowledge out of very 
few occurrences, but in general we struggle 
to replicate and transfer learning processes 
across educational subjects. Machines, on the contrary, require 
very large data sets8 to achieve pattern recognition, and struggle 
to generalize knowledge. However, they excel at transferring and 
replicating pattern recognition at scale once it is achieved. Facial 
recognition is the most well-known example of this. Second, while 
autonomous machines that combine the most advanced AI and 
robotics techniques are still poor at reproducing very basic non-
cognitive motor functions mastered by most animals (for example, 
walking or hand-manipulation), they are increasingly proving 
very adept at outperforming humans over a number of complex 
cognitive functions, for example, image recognition in radiology and 
computationally-intensive tasks.
ARTIFICIAL ‘NARROW’ INTELLIGENCE VS. ARTIFICIAL ‘GENERAL’ 
INTELLIGENCE
The penultimate boundary we need to explore to better delineate 
and understand what we mean by artifi cial intelligence is the frontier 
between Artifi cial Narrow Intelligence (ANI, also called “weak” AI) 
and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI, also called “strong” AI). 
For a majority of experts, AGI refers to an autonomous machine’s 
ability to perform any intellectual tasks that a human can perform. 
This implies generalizing and abstracting learning across various 
cognitive functions. Transferring learning autonomously and nimbly 
from one domain to another has happened only very embryonically 
thus far9.
According to experts, the most advanced artificial intelligence 
systems available today, such as the famous IBM Watson10 or 
8  As a matter of comparison, a child needs to be exposed to fi ve to ten images of elephant to be able 
to recognize an ‘elephant’ while a deep neural networks requires over a million images. 
9  See here the emerging fi eld of “transfer knowledge” perceived by an increasing number 
of experts, including Google Deepmind as a potential path of accelerated progress in the 
coming decades. See here for example https://hackernoon.com/transfer-learning-and-
the-rise-of-collaborative-artifi cial-intelligence-41f9e2950657#.n5aboetnm and https://
medium.com/@thoszymkowiak/deepmind-just-published-a-mind-blowing-paper-pathnet-
f72b1ed38d46#.6fnivpish 
10  See https://www.ibm.com/cognitive/
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Google’s AlphaGo11, are still “narrow” (weak), in the sense that 
they operate strictly within the confine of the scenarios for which 
they are programmed. Even if they are capable of generalizing 
pattern recognition, for instance transferring knowledge learned 
in the frame of image recognition into speech recognition12, we 
are still very far away from the versatility of a human mind. This 
is expected to change with the convergence of machine learning 
and neurosciences in the coming decades, but experts disagree 
profoundly over the probability and timeline of the march towards 
AGI: some say it will never happen; some say it will take one hundred 
years or more; some say thirty; and some say ten13.
Beyond the discord among experts, relying on the frontier between 
narrow and general artifi cial intelligence is problematic because of 
its very benchmark for measurement: human intelligence. Since 
we still have an imperfect understanding today of the complex 
processes driving the brain and the way human intelligence and 
consciousness manifest themselves, excessively relying on that 
boundary to gauge the transformative impact of the rise of AI could 
be risky. It could expose us to major blind spots, with supposed 
“advances” masking major socio-economic externalities which we 
need to anticipate in order to adapt. We recommend doing more 
research to delineate that boundary and map its surroundings as 
well as their evolution more precisely. 
Beyond their disagreement, experts broadly agree on two levels. 
First the socio-economic impacts of the current rise of ANI will bring 
about serious consequences, generating new opportunities, new 
risks, and new challenges. Second, the advent of an AGI later this 
century would amplify these consequences by—at least—an order 
of magnitude. More research is needed to map and understand what 
these consequences would be as well as how they would play out 
socially and economically. 
THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS; 
AND SPECULATIONS OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTELLIGENCE 
EXPLOSION
The final boundary we need to explore to map the future terrain 
of AI is that of consciousness. Here, there is a broad consensus 
among experts: neither the most advanced AI systems currently 
existing, nor the ones that are expected to be developed in the 
coming decades, exhibit consciousness. Machines (programs 
running on connected and sensing computer systems) are not 
aware of themselves, and this “functionality” may never be 
possible. But, again, a word of caution: since science is still far from 
having explained the mysteries of animal sentience and human 
consciousness, that boundary remains more fragile that it seems. 
11  See https://deepmind.com/research/alphago/
12   See https://hackernoon.com/transfer-learning-and-the-rise-of-collaborative-artifi cial-
intelligence-41f9e2950657#.n5aboetnm 
13  A detailed study of AI timeline surveys carried out by AI Impacts in 2015 concluded: “If we collapse 
a few slightly different meanings of ‘human-level AI’: median estimates for when there will be a 10% 
chance of human-level AI are all in the 2020s (from seven surveys); median estimates for when 
there will be a 50% chance of human-level AI range between 2035 and 2050 (from seven surveys); 
of three surveys in recent decades asking for predictions but not probabilities, two produced 
median estimates of when human-level AI will arrive in the 2050s, and one in 2085. One small, 
informal survey asking about how far we have come rather than how far we have to go implies 
over a century until human-level AI, at odds with the other surveys. Participants appear to mostly 
be experts in AI or related areas, but with a large contingent of others. Several groups of survey 
participants seem likely over-represent people who are especially optimistic about human-level AI 
being achieved soon”. See http://aiimpacts.org/ai-timeline-surveys/ 
Finally, one speculative but highly consequential 
long-term scenario which constantly appears 
in mainstream media and across the expert 
community: “the technological singularity”. 
According to that hotly contested scenario, 
popularized by the inventor, futurist, and now 
Director of Engineering at Google, Ray Kurzweil, 
the rise of AI could lead to an “intell igence 
explosion” as early as 2045. It would result from 
the emergence of an Artifi cial Super Intelligence 
(ASI): a self-recursive AI improving exponentially, 
which could follow relatively quickly (a few 
decades or less) the advent of an Artifi cial General 
Intelligence (AGI). If this scenario were to unfold, it 
would naturally carry with it potentially existential 
consequences for mankind and intelligent life.14 
We recommend nurturing a reasonable debate 
across the expert community, and society at large, 
over the possibilities and consequences of an ASI, 
to enable responsible investment choices and risk 
management. Framing the conversation in the 
right way will be critical: in this case, transparency 
and moderation will be key.
To be clear, the analysis we will carry out in the 
remainder of this article excludes the AGI or 
ASI scenarios. To narrow the definition even 
further for practical analytical purpose, “Artifi cial 
Intelligence” will henceforth mean machine-
learning algorithms, which combine various 
techniques (e.g. deep learning), and are associated 
with sensors and other computer programs and 
algorithms. These sense,15 comprehend,16 and 
act17 on the world, learning from experience and 
adapting over time.
14  For more information, see Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, 
Dangers, Strategies, Oxford University Press, 2014.
15  Computer vision and audio processing, for example, are able to 
actively perceive the world around them by acquiring and processing 
images, sounds and speech. Facial and speech recognition are two 
typical applications.
16  Natural language processing and inference engines can enable 
analysis of the information collected. Language translation is a typical 
application.
17  An AI system can take cognitive action like decision-making (e.g. credit 
application or tumor diagnostic) or undertake actions in the physical 
world (e.g. from assisted braking to full auto-pilot in cars). 
“RELYING ON THE FRONTIER BETWEEN 
NARROW AND GENERAL ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IS PROBLEMATIC BECAUSE OF 
ITS VERY BENCHMARK FOR MEASUREMENT: 
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE. SINCE WE STILL 
HAVE AN IMPERFECT UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE LATTER, EXCESSIVELY RELYING ON THAT 
BOUNDARY TO GAUGE THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
IMPACT OF THE RISE OF AI COULD BE RISKY.”
Understanding the rise 






Unlimited access to supercomputing on the 
cloud — a market estimated to reach $70 billion 
in 201518 — and continued growth in big data, 
which has had a compound annual growth rate 
of more than 50 percent since 2010,19 are the two 
key macro-trends powering the rise of Artificial 
Intelligence. AI systems are already profoundly 
changing the way we live, work, and socialize. 
On the market are virtual personal assistants, 
recommendation engines, self-driving cars, 
surveillance systems, crop prediction, smart grids, 
drones, banking and trading, and gene-sequencing 
machines. More and more multinationals are now 
shifting their business models to revolve around 
data and predictive analytics to be able to capture 
the productivity gains generated by the rise of AI.
This revolution is fueled on the one hand by the 
quest for technological solutions to address 
pressing global challenges, including climate 
change, grow th and development, securit y 
or demography which increasingly unfold in 
urban environment. On the other hand, it is 
spurred by the continuing international strategic 
competition whereby nation-states fund science 
and early innovation in pursuit of technological 
dominance, which private global players then 
scale up, competing with others to become 
“go-to” platforms. Though the ambiguity of the 
defi nitional boundaries of “Artifi cial Intelligence” 
constrains the abil it y to generate a robust 
classif ication or ranking of most advanced 
countries in the field of AI, capabilities in the 
field of computer sciences and Information & 
Communication Technologies (ICT) can be used 
as a proxy. Accordingly, the U.S., China, Russia, 
Japan, South Korea, the U.K., France, Germany, 
and Israel are emerging as the dominant players 
in AI. Given their techno-scientifi c capabilities and 
their large market size, India and Brazil should also 
fi gure in this leading group, even if they are yet to 





THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS
National governments have historically played, and will continue 
to play, a key role in spurring the rise of AI through the allocation 
of higher education, research & development budgets for defense, 
security, healthcare, science and technology (e.g. computer 
sciences, neuroscience, ICT), infrastructure (especially transport, 
energy, healthcare, and fi nance), and pro-innovation policies. AI is 
increasingly perceived as a source of technological dominance in the 
information age where cyber and physical worlds merge as hybrids, 
so more and more countries have or are in the process of releasing 
national strategies for AI.
In the U.S., where the term Artificial Intelligence was coined, and 
which has been a pioneer in the fi eld since its inception in the 1950s, 
the Obama Administration led an inter-agency initiative last year 
on “Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence.”20 This high-
level initiative culminated with the release of a “National Research 
& Development Artificial Intelligence Strategic Plan,”21 as well as 
two reports.22 Historically, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA), and more recently the Intelligence Advance 
Research Projects Activity (IARPA), have provided long-term high-
risk investment in AI, playing an instrumental role in most AI techno-
scientifi c breakthroughs. Last year, the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) unveiled its “Third Offset” strategy23 with a total five-year 
investment of $18 billion24. To maintain technological dominance, this 
macro-strategy plans on bringing AI and autonomous systems to the 
forefront of all U.S. battle digital networks, operational, planning and 
support processes. DoD’s operational goal is to make such processes 
faster and more efficient. In January 2017, a report published by a 
group of elite scientists which advises the U.S. Government on sensitive 
technoscientifi c matters confi rmed the strategic importance of the rise 
of AI for defense capabilities25.
Meanwhile, the Chinese Government unveiled an ambitious three-
year national AI plan in May 2016. The plan was formulated jointly 
by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry 
20  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/03/preparing-future-artifi cial-
intelligence
21 https://www.nitrd.gov/PUBS/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf
22  Executive Offi ce of the U.S. President, “Preparing for the Future of Artifi cial Intelligence”, 
October 2016. And “Artifi cial Intelligence, Automation and the Economy”, December 2016.
23  DEPSECDEF, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-
third-us-offset-strategyand-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies. The “First Offset Strategy” 
refers to the development of nuclear weapons, the “Second Offset Strategy” to precision guided 
munitions.
24  Mackenzie Eaglen, “What is the Third Offset Strategy”, Real Clear Defense, February 2016.  
Note: this $18 billion fi ve-year investment goes far beyond Artifi cial Intelligence.
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/02/16/what_is_the_third_offset_
strategy_109034.html 
25  JASON, The MITRE Corporation, Report on Perspectives on Research in Artifi cial Intelligence 
and Artifi cial General Intelligence Relevant to DoD, January 2017. https://fas.org/irp/agency/
dod/jason/ai-dod.pdf 
“MORE AND MORE MULTINATIONALS ARE 
NOW SHIFTING THEIR BUSINESS MODELS 
TO REVOLVE AROUND DATA AND PREDICTIVE 
ANALYTICS TO BE ABLE TO CAPTURE 
THE PRODUCTIVITY GAINS GENERATED 
BY THE RISE OF AI.”
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of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, and the Cyberspace Administration of China. The 
government envisions creating a $15 billion market by 2018 by 
investing in research and supporting the development of the Chinese 
AI techno-industrial base. Anecdotally, the country surpassed the 
U.S. last year in terms of the number of papers published annually 
on “deep learning.”26 The rate of increase was remarkably steep, 
refl ecting how quickly China’s research priorities have shifted.
Beyond U.S. and China, Japan, South Korea,27 France,28 the U.K,29 
and Germany are also in the process of developing specific plans 
and strategies in AI, robotics, and other complementary sectors.
THE PLATFORM BUSINESS
From the business perspective, we seem to be heading towards 
a global oligopoly dominated by a dozen U.S. (Google, Apple, 
Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and IBM) and Chinese (Baidu, 
Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi) multinationals controlling AI.
For competition played on the global stage, the key factor for 
success is no longer the length of computer code, but the size of 
databases. As of now, AI  needs to see millions of pictures of animals 
or cars to achieve actionable pattern recognition. Facebook has 
effectively relied on the nearly ten billion images published every 
26  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/10/13/china-has-now-
eclipsed-us-in-ai-research/
27  South Korea government announced in March last year a $863 million fi ve-year R&D investment 
in AI. http://www.nature.com/news/south-korea-trumpets-860-million-ai-fund-after-alphago-
shock-1.19595 
28  France’s government announced in January 2017 it is working on a National AI Strategy to be 
published in March 2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/en/franceia-the-national-artifi cial-
intelligence-strategy-is-underway 
29  UK Government announced in January that AI would be at the center of its post-Brexit “Modern 
Industrial Strategy”. http://www.cbronline.com/news/verticals/central-government/modern-
industrial-strategy-theresa-may-bets-ai-robotics-5g-uks-long-term-future/. See also U.K. 
Government Offi ce for Science, Report on “Artifi cial Intelligence: opportunities and implications 
for the future of decision-making”, 2016 (page 6)  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/566075/
gs-16-19-artifi cial-intelligence-ai-report.pdf
day by its users to continuously improve its 
visual recognition algorithms. Similarly, Google 
DeepMind has relied heavily on YouTube video 
clips to train its AI image recognition software. 
In a way, consumers are used as commodities 
to train AI systems through their behaviors and 
interactions.
The effi ciency of AI systems  has also relied on the 
use of specifi c microprocessors, which are playing 
an increasing role in the IT infrastructure on the 
cloud. For example, the training phase of the deep 
neural networks has tended to rely on so-called 
“Graphic Processing Units” (GPUs), processors 
which were initially designed for video games and 
have become more powerful over the years30. For 
the implementation phase, digital giants tend 
to develop dedicated processors. Google, for 
instance, developed the “Tensor Processing Unit” 
(TPU), while Microsoft has repurposed “Field 
Programmable Gate Array” (FPGA).
These digital giants are building ecosystems 
around an “AI tap” that they control, and an 
intense competition is on to become the “go to” AI 
platforms which host consumers’ and businesses’ 
data. Selling AI through the “software-as-a-
service” (SAAS) business model seems to be the 
route which Google and IBM have adopted. The 
start-up landscape is also very active in this area. 
According to CB Insight, the value of AI Mergers 
& Acquisitions (M&A) has increased from $160 
million in 2012 to over $658 million in 2016, 
while disclosed funding rose from $589 million 
to over $5 billion over the same time period.31 
Nearly 62 percent of the deals in 2016 went to 
U.S. start-ups, down from 79 percent in 2012,32 
with U.K., Israeli, Indian, and Canadian start-ups 
following respectively. The AI market is expected 
to represent from $40 to $70 billion by 2020, 
depending on defi nitional boundaries.33
Machine-learning algorithms require a vast 
amount of data to achieve ef ficient pattern 
recognition, so consumer markets’ crit ical 
mass appears to be a crucial enabler of the 
establishment of AI techno-industrial bases, in 
tandem with technoscientifi c capabilities.
30  http://www.nvidia.com/object/what-is-gpu-computing.html . 
See also JASON, Report on Perspectives on Research in Artifi cial 
Intelligence and Artifi cial General Intelligence Relevant to DoD, (p. 7 
& 15). Ibid. 
31  CB Insights, “The 2016 AI Recap: Startups See Record High In Deals 
And Funding”, January 2017, https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/
artifi cial-intelligence-startup-funding/ . Important note: these fi gures 
don’t include the Chinese market.
32  Ibid.
33  http://techemergence.com/valuing-the-artifi cial-intelligence-
market-2016-and-beyond/ ; and https://www.bofaml.com/content/
dam/boamlimages/documents/PDFs/robotics_and_ai_condensed_
primer.pdf
Understanding the rise 
of Artifi cial Intelligence 
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